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Reasons for Action:  
Wittgensteinian and Davidsonian Perspectives 
in Historical and Meta-Philosophical Context 
 
Abstract 
My paper reflects on the debate about reasons for action and action 
explanations between Wittgensteinian teleological approaches and 
causalist theories inspired by Davidson. After a brief discussion of 
similarities and differences in the philosophy of language, I sketch the 
prehistory and history of the controversy. I show that the conflict 
between Wittgenstein and Davidson revolves neither around 
revisionism nor around naturalism. Even in the philosophy of mind 
and action, Davidson is not as remote from Wittgenstein and his 
followers as is commonly assumed: there are numerous points of 
contact of both a biographical and a substantive kind. The real conflict 
concerns the difference between Davidson’s official subjectivist 
approach to reasons for action, according to which they are mental 
states of believing and desiring (or their onsets) on the one hand, and 
an objectivist approach, according to which reasons for action are 
what is believed or desired, non-mental facts or states of affairs.  
1. Wittgenstein and Davidson: Similarities 
2013 marked the 60th anniversary of the posthumous publication of 
Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations. It also marked the 10th 
anniversary of the death of Donald Davidson and the 50th 
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anniversary of his seminal article “Actions, Reasons and Causes” 
(ARC): a fitting occasion to reflect on the relation between 
Wittgenstein and Davidson. Several areas invite comparison (Glock 
2003: 1-39 and 2013). There are interesting parallels at the strategic 
level. In different ways, both are part of the linguistic turn of 
analytic philosophy: they ascribe a central philosophical role to 
language, albeit for different reasons. Furthermore, they propound 
conceptions of language and the mind that shun both Platonism 
and Cartesianism. Linguistic expressions acquire meaning not by 
being associated with either abstract entities or private mental 
processes, but by having a certain role or function. More generally, 
in both Davidson and the later Wittgenstein there are important 
themes that are loosely speaking pragmatist, notably the stress on 
the philosophical importance of human action, a holistic 
perspective that views individual expressions, sentences and 
thoughts as part of a larger context of activity, and a 
communitarian tendency to view that context as inherently social. 
Finally, both share an anthropological approach to philosophy. 
Even their discussions of topics apparently unrelated to human 
affairs – e.g. truth, modality, mathematics, causation – revolve 
ultimately around a philosophical anthropology, a conception of human 
behaviour and human capacities in general, and of language and 
linguistic capacities in particular. 
In the later Wittgenstein, there is a pervasive, albeit often 
implicit, anthropological theme. It comes to the fore in the central 
role he assigned to “forms of life” (see Glock 1996: 124-129). 
Wittgenstein believed that an “ethnological point of view” 
envisaging different types of human practices helps philosophers to 
see “matters more objectively” (CV 37). 
He used to say that what we might call “the anthropological method” 
had proved particularly fruitful in philosophy: that is, imagining “a 
tribe among whom it [a certain human activity] is carried on in this 
way: …” (Rhees 1965: 25) 
The central place of human beings and human action in Davidson’s 
work has been noticed less. Yet his heuristic device of “radical 
interpretation”, though derived from Quine’s “radical translation”, 
is connected to Wittgenstein’s anthropological method. Radical 
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interpretation is the attempt to understand an alien community 
without the benefit of any prior knowledge of what its members 
think or what their utterances mean. Following Quine’s 
indeterminacy of translation, Davidson argues that there are equally 
correct though mutually incompatible ways of making sense of the 
interpretees. Whereas Wittgenstein envisages exotic practices, e.g. 
measuring lengths through elastic rulers, Davidson envisages 
deviant interpretations, e.g. rendering alien sentences as statements 
not about material objects but about their centres of gravity. Both 
procedures, however, raise the spectre of alternative ways of thinking 
and acting that have hitherto gone unnoticed. 
To be sure, this is not the purpose for which Davidson employs 
radical interpretation. By considering the anthropological scenario, 
he instead hopes to shed light on the master-problem of his 
thought: What is it to understand other human beings? His solution 
is provided by a unified theory of meaning and thought which 
intertwines the philosophy of language, the philosophy of mind 
and the theory of action (2004: ch. 10). Understanding what a 
person does, what she believes and desires, and what she means by 
her utterances are part of a single enterprise. The aim is to 
understand human behaviour by explaining it causally. 
Nevertheless, the picture of human beings that emerges has strong 
Kantian affinities. Although we are part of the causal order, we 
must also treat each other as rational agents. For, following 
Davidson’s well-known “principle of charity”, the only way of 
making sense of the mental states of agents, their linguistic 
utterances and their actions is to regard them as being by-and-large 
rational. 
There are also similarities between Wittgenstein and Davidson 
at a tactical level. One is a striking affinity between the Tractatus and 
Davidson’s idea of a systematic theory of meaning for natural 
languages. The immediate roots of this project lie in the logical 
semantics of Tarski. However, the languages Davidson is interested 
in are natural rather than artificial. In this respect, he stands in the 
tradition not of Tarski and Quine, but of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus. 
Formal logic does not furnish an ideal language which avoids the 
shortcomings of ordinary language, it serves to indicate the 
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underlying logical form that sentences in the vernacular possessed all 
along. Contrary to received wisdom, therefore, neither the early 
Wittgenstein nor Davidson are ideal language philosophers. 
Quine’s naturalism lays claim to constituting the revisionary 
metaphysics of modern science. By contrast to his teacher and 
friend, however, Davidson aims to bring out the “metaphysics 
implicit in natural language”. He is interested not in “improving on 
natural language, but in understanding it”. Alluding to a simile of 
the later Wittgenstein, he describes “the language of science not as 
a substitute for our present language, but as a suburb of it” (1984: 
203; 1985b: 172, 176). Again in line with the later Wittgenstein, 
Davidson subscribes to a third-person perspective on language. 
More specifically, he links the linguistic meaning of an expression 
to its use. 
“[M]eaning is use”, quoth Wittgenstein. The idea is obvious, but its 
full force is mostly unappreciated or misappropriated. Misappropriated 
by those who would convert any typical purpose served by uttering a 
sentence into a kind of meaning. Unappreciated by those who treat 
Wittgenstein’s slogan as gesturing at a way of discovering a meaning 
already embedded in an expression. What wants emphasizing is not 
that use points the way to preexisting meanings, but that it creates, and 
so constitutes, meaning. (1999b: 80) 
From a bird’s eye view of contemporary analytic philosophy, 
Wittgenstein and Davidson may appear comparatively close, at least 
relative to the revival of essentialist metaphysics on the one hand, 
the naturalistic dissolution of philosophy into research programmes 
in cognitive science and AI on the other. 
2. Wittgenstein and Davidson: Differences 
The differences are equally important. The later Wittgenstein 
became highly sceptical about the philosophical value of logical 
analysis, notwithstanding the aforementioned fact that his own 
Tractatus was one of the major inspirations behind formal 
semantics. By contrast, following Tarski and Quine, Davidson sets 
great store by the power of formal logic. But then again, like Quine, 
Davidson combines logical analysis and formal semantics à la 
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Tarski and Carnap with a pragmatist emphasis on language as a 
form of human behaviour. 
Next, whereas Wittgenstein’s conception of the connection 
between meaning and use is normativist and communitarian, 
Davidson’s is anti-normativist and individualist (Glock 2010). Both 
agree that expressions do not have an intrinsic linguistic meaning. 
Rather, what they mean is determined by how they are used. 
… let’s not forget that a word hasn’t got a meaning given to it, as it 
were, by a power independent of us, so that there could be a kind of 
scientific investigation into what the word really means. A word has the 
meaning someone has given to it. (BBB 28) 
… when we learn or discover what words mean, the process of 
learning is bestowing on words whatever meaning they have for the 
learner. It’s not as though words have some wonderful thing called a 
meaning to which those words have somehow become attached, and 
the learning process is just putting us in touch with that meaning. 
(Davidson 1999b: 41) 
However, Davidson turns the dependence of meaning on use 
into an argument against the Wittgensteinian idea that meaning is 
constituted by shared rules of use: if the meaning of an expression e 
in a language L is determined or constituted by the use speakers 
make of e, the meaning of e cannot at the same time prescribe a 
certain use to the speakers of L. Accordingly, the idea that the use 
of e is governed by lexical norms is incompatible with the idea that 
meaning is determined by use. It is a lapse into the Platonist picture 
according to which “the meanings of words are magically 
independent of the speaker’s intentions” (Davidson 1990a: 310). 
Wittgenstein and his followers would answer this complaint as 
follows: We must distinguish between the use an individual speaker 
a makes of e, and the use that the linguistic community C makes of 
it. Communal use constitutes meaning, while individual use is responsible 
to it. By this token, the existence of lexical norms and their 
independence of the utterances and intentions of individual 
speakers is no more mysterious than the existence of legal norms 
and their independence of the acts and motives of individual 
agents. 
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For related reasons, the social dimension of language that our 
protagonists diagnose is strikingly different. Wittgenstein’s private 
language argument purports to demonstrate the incoherence of the 
idea of a language that is not subject to semantic rules that can be 
shared between different speakers, without excluding the possibility 
of a solitary language that a speaker uses for purposes other than 
communication. Davidson’s triangulation argument aims to show 
that thought and meaning require actual communication, but without 
requiring that this communicative employment be guided by rules, 
let alone rules shared between speaker and hearer. As a result, he 
regards language as a sum of idiolects, whereas for Wittgenstein it is a 
normative practice shared between the members of a linguistic 
community. 
Wittgenstein and Davidson are closer in the results they reach 
through, respectively, the anthropological method and radical 
interpretation. Both insist that there are minimal requirements which a 
form of linguistic behaviour must meet in order to be intelligible to 
us. According to the principle of charity, interpretation 
presupposes that we can treat the aliens' beliefs as by and large true 
(Glock 2003: 194-199). Wittgenstein concurs partly. “If language is 
to be a means of communication there must be agreement not only 
in definitions but also ... in judgements” (PI §242). But while the 
principle of charity stresses the second point, it discards the first. 
By maximizing agreement in opinion it puts the cart – truth –
before the horse – meaning. By and large, we must understand what 
people say in order to judge whether they are speaking the truth. The 
consensus presupposed in sharing a language is ultimately “not 
agreement in opinions but in form of life” (PI §241; see RFM 353). 
By the same token, understanding an alien language relies on 
convergence not of beliefs, but of patterns of behaviour, which in turn 
presupposes common perceptual capacities, needs and emotions: 
“The common behaviour of mankind is the system of reference by 
means of which we interpret an unknown language” (PI §206). 
Finally, both Wittgenstein and Davidson have interesting yet 
disparate views on the topic of animal minds and animal thought. 
Both approach mental phenomena from a third-person 
perspective. They do not appeal to phenomena – whether mental 
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or neurophysiological – that cannot be manifested in behaviour 
even in principle. Both hold in effect that one cannot attribute 
beliefs to creatures who are totally incapable of manifesting these 
beliefs, Davidson because he cannot make sense of the notion of a 
belief as a private attitude completely detached from behaviour and 
its explanation (1984: 170; 2001: 99-100), Wittgenstein because he 
insists that we can ascribe a thought that p to a creature a only if 
something counts as a thinking that p rather than that q. But there is 
also a crucial difference. Unlike Wittgenstein, Davidson insists that 
even for simple beliefs, the required behaviour must include linguistic 
behaviour. Consequently he denies that non-linguistic animals have 
any thoughts. Wittgenstein (by contrast to some of his disciples) 
adopts a position closer to common sense – for once, many might 
be tempted to say. Animals are capable of having beliefs, desires 
and intentions of a simple kind, namely those that can be expressed 
in non-linguistic behaviour (Glock 2000). 
3. Actions, Reasons and Explanations 
This “compare and contrast” exercise could be continued on 
several other topics. My paper is devoted to one of them. It is the 
nature of action, and, more specifically, of reasons for action, and 
of action explanations. This cluster of issues is particularly topical 
because of the aforementioned anniversary of Davidson’s most 
famous article. It is also essential to interpreting and comparing our 
two protagonists, given the central place they accord to human 
behaviour. Finally, agency is an especially fruitful subject from a 
philosophical point of view. The debate between, loosely speaking, 
Wittgensteinian teleological approaches and causalist theories 
inspired by Davidson has been reopened over the last 20 years. In 
the process, novel light has been thrown on age-old problems that 
mainstream theorists of action had regarded as settled. 
The three central problems in the theory of action are: 
1. What are (intentional, voluntary, rational, etc.) actions? 
(The nature of actions.) 
2. What are the reasons for which (intentional, voluntary, 
rational, etc.) actions are performed? (The nature of 
reasons for action.) 
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3. How are actions to be adequately explained? In particular, 
what is the nature and status of explanations of actions by 
reference to the reasons for which agents perform them? 
(The nature of action explanation.) 
The problem of the nature of actions revolves around a set of 
interconnected differences:  
 the difference between what agents do and what merely 
happens; 
 the more specific difference between what agents do and 
what happens to them (what they undergo); 
 the difference between what agents do and what they 
deliberately refrain from doing (acts vs. omissions); 
 the difference between what agents do, and what they 
merely cause or bring about, e.g. what they intend to do 
and its unintended side-effects; 
 the difference between intentional actions and mere 
behaviour, e.g. automatic or unconscious reactions or the 
behaviour of (all or many) non-human animals. 
As regards the first contrast, actions are standardly conceived as 
a species of events. There are alternative proposals which assign 
actions to other categories, or regard them as sui generis, constituting 
a category of their own. These alternatives are incompatible with a 
major contention of Davidson’s; and some of them (notably von 
Wright 1963: 35-7; 1971: ch. II; see Stoutland 2010) – were inspired 
by Wittgenstein. Nevertheless, for the sake of exposition and 
argument I shall assume that actions are events.  
This establishes a minimal common ground with the causal 
theories epitomized by Davidson. They treat actions as events with a 
special kind of cause. Causal theories of action – causalism in short – 
distinguish themselves from other positions – notably those 
invoking agent causation – through their stance on the other two 
problems – the nature of reasons for actions and the nature of 
explanations of actions by reference to such reasons--what 
Davidson calls “rationalizations” and I “intentional explanations”. 
According to causalism about reasons, the reason for which an 
agent A acts is an inner mental cause of A’s outer bodily movements / 
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behaviour. According to causalism about explanations, the 
intentional explanation of A’s action is an explanation in terms of 
efficient causes, just like explanations of physical events. 
It is sometimes suggested that causalism about reasons is a 
“stronger” and causalism about explanation a “weaker claim” 
(Alvarez 2007: 105). Accordingly, causalism about reasons implies 
causalism about explanations, yet not vice versa. Both claims are to 
be taken with a pinch of salt. As regards the second, one can deny 
that reasons themselves are causes of actions, while insisting that 
intentional explanations make reference to efficient causes associated 
with reasons (see sct. 14). As regards the first: if reasons are efficient 
interior causes of actions, explaining the latter by reference to 
reasons is indeed a species of causal explanation, in the sense that it 
talks about efficient causes. Nonetheless the way we talk about reasons 
and actions in intentional explanations might differ from the way we 
talk about the relation between other efficient causes and their 
effects. The terms referring to actions and reasons in intentional 
explanations and the terms referring to events in other causal 
explanations might have the same reference yet differ in Fregean 
sense. Causalism about explanation does require, however, that the 
relation we attribute is the same in all cases, namely one of efficient 
causation. 
4. The History of the Debate 
Causalism has been the default position in modern philosophy. 
From Descartes through Hobbes, Locke, Berkeley, Hume and Mill 
to Prichard, actions were regarded as bodily movements caused by 
interior acts of the will (“volitions”). Volitionism was decisively 
refuted by Wittgenstein and Ryle (Candlish & Damnjanovic 2010).1 
This did not spell the end for causalism, however. As regards 
reasons for action, mentalist versions referring to acts of a mind or 
soul were replaced by materialist versions, according to which the 
                                                          
1  One related question remains controversial, namely whether all actions involve an 
element of trying. When we , do we always try to ? This is claimed by Hornsby (1980) 
and Grice (1989). For a Wittgensteinian rebuttal of the Gricean defence of this position 
by appeal to conversational implicatures see Glock 1996. 
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reasons/causes of action are neurophysiological phenomena. As 
regards the explanation of action, there had been a prolonged 
Erklären-Verstehen (explaining-understanding) controversy in the 
19th century. It pitted positivists and empiricists like Mill against the 
hermeneutic tradition and neo-Kantianism. The hermeneutic side 
led by Dilthey insisted that the explanations of actions in the social 
and historical sciences is a sui generis form of understanding which is 
fundamentally distinct from the causal explanations in terms of 
efficient causes furnished by the natural sciences. 2  Logical 
positivists, led by Hempel (1942), combated this methodological 
pluralism in the name of the unity of science. They denied that 
there is a fundamental methodological difference between the 
explanations of actions by reference to reasons and the causal 
(deductive-nomological) explanations of natural science.  
Ryle’s The Concept of Mind and Wittgenstein’s Philosophical 
Investigations marked a turn against logical positivism and causalism. 
They fuelled the rise of an analytic variant of hermeneutics (von 
Wright 1971: 29-30, 181-2). Analytic hermeneuticians like Dray, 
Winch, von Wright and Taylor tried to reinstate the dichotomy 
between causal explanation and the understanding of actions. 
Wittgenstein also inspired thinkers like Anscombe, Kenny and 
Melden. They were interested less in the methodology of the 
humanities and social sciences and more in moral psychology, 
especially the problem of freedom, the former two from an 
Aristotelian-cum-Thomist perspective. 3  Both the analytic 
                                                          
2 A different though related methodological disctinction was drawn by neo-Kantians like 
Windelband and Rickert, namely between the natural sciences which are “nomothetic”, 
i.e. concerned with general laws and the social/historical sciences which are 
“ideographic”, i.e. concerned with individual cases. This dichotomy is connected with the 
issue of psychological laws. 
3 Aristotle himself has been claimed for the causalist camp (e.g. Davidson 1980: 11). After 
all, he contends that “the origin of action – its efficient, not its final cause – is choice, and 
that of choice is desire and reasoning with a view to an end” (Nichomachean Ethics 1139a 
32ff.). The attribution has been contested by Alvarez 2007: 113-4n. She invokes 
Nichomachean Ethics 1139 b2-3. “Hence choice is either desiderative reason or rationative 
desire, and such an origin of action is a man”. But this at best shows that Aristotle thought 
that the efficient causes of action include both a choice by the agent and the agent herself 
– a version of agent causation. Such a position is of dubious coherence: i) it portrays the 
action as causally overdetermined; ii) it assimilates two rather distinct relations in which 
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hermeneuticians and the moral psychologists propounded 
teleological accounts and opposed causalism: the reasons for which 
agents act are not interior events causing the action, and intentional 
explanations are toto caelo different from causal explanations. 
During the 1950s and the early 1960s, teleological approaches 
dominated the theory of action, especially in Britain. This short-
lived Wittgensteinian orthodoxy was epitomized by (though far 
from confined to) a series entitled Studies in Philosophical Psychology 
(see Sandis 2015). Looking back, Davidson wrote.  
In December of 1961 Hempel gave the presidential address at the 
annual meeting of the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical 
Association. The title was “Rational Action”. In that address, Hempel 
argued that explanation of intentional action by appeal to the agent’s 
reasons does not differ in its general logical character from 
explanation generally; in taking this position, he was swimming against 
a very strong neo-Wittgensteinian current of small red books. 
(Davidson 1980: 261) 
Just in case you thought that Davidson might have had Mao bibles 
in mind, he stated the aim of “Actions, Reasons and Causes” as 
follows: 
In this paper I want to defend the ancient – and commonsense – 
position that rationalization is a species of causal explanation. The 
defence no doubt requires some redeployment, but it does not seem 
necessary to abandon the position, as has been urged by many recent 
writers [n: Some examples: Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind, G.E.M. 
Anscombe, Intention, Stuart Hampshire, Thought and Action, H.L.A. Hart 
and A.M. Honoré, Causation in the Law, William Dray, Laws and 
Explanation in History, and most of the books in the series edited by 
R.F. Holland, Studies in Philosophical Psychology, including Anthony 
Kenny, Action, Emotion and Will, and A.I. Melden, Free Action. 
(Davidson 1980: 3) 
There is no doubt that Davidson succeeded in stemming the “neo-
Wittgensteinian” tide of “small red books”. His article reinstated 
causalism not merely as the majority view, but as something that is 
widely regarded as a truism. The version of causalism inspired by 
                                                                                                                                                                        
the action stands, namely to a choice and to the agent, lumping both together under the 
label of efficient causes.  
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Davidson is known as “the standard story” (Smith 2004). 
According to this story, actions are bodily movements that are both 
explained and rationalized by inner – mental or neurophysiological 
– states or events. ARC owed its success to a powerful 
combination of rebuttals of then popular anti-causalist arguments 
and novel considerations in favour of causalism. To its mainstream 
proponents, the fact that causalism rose like Phoenix from the 
ashes simply reflects the compelling nature of the arguments – 
both negative and positive – propounded by Davidson and his 
followers. Unsurprisingly, opponents of causalism reject that 
diagnosis. Although few of them recognize this, they owe us, 
among other things, an alternative explanation of why causalism 
caught on as a renewed orthodoxy. The next section discusses an 
interesting attempt to meet that obligation. 
5. Teleology vs. Causalism – a Battle in a “Meta-
Philosophical War”? 
Among contemporary Wittgensteinians, it is a commonplace that 
the influence of Wittgenstein on analytic philosophy has declined 
sharply since the 1960s, and that many of his lessons have been 
forgotten. It is equally common to blame this melancholy 
development not on the quality of specific objections raised against 
Wittgenstein’s ideas, but on misunderstandings on the one hand, 
general philosophical trends like the rise of naturalism on the other 
(Glock 1996: 29 and, more elaborately, Hacker 1996: ch. 8). 
Regarding the specific case of the waxing of Davidsonian causalism 
and the waning of Wittgensteinian teleology, D’Oro has recently 
furnished a similar diagnosis.  
In the following I argue that the success of causalism cannot be fully 
accounted for by considering the outcome of first-order debates in the 
philosophy of action and that it is to be explained instead by a shift in 
meta-philosophical assumptions. It is the commitment to a certain 
second-order view of the role and character of philosophical analysis, 
rather than the conclusive nature of the arguments for causalism, that 
is largely responsible for the rise of the recent causalist consensus. 
(2012: 207) 
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According to D’Oro, the “philosophical battle” between 
causalists and teleologists is part of a “meta-philosophical war”, and 
its outcome depends on that of this wider conflict. More 
specifically, it depends on the outcome of a conflict between what 
Strawson famously labelled, respectively, descriptive and 
revisionary metaphysics. Teleological accounts, D’Oro contends, 
pursue a descriptive project, while a revisionist orientation is taken 
for granted by causalists. Accordingly, the “official story” of the 
triumph of causalism is incorrect. Causalism cannot be supported 
by “Davidson’s master-argument”, as the best explanation of the 
distinction between a reason A had to  and the reason for which 
A actually -ed. It could only be established if its revisionist meta-
philosophy could be vindicated against the descriptivist alternative. 
And D’Oro leaves little doubt that she regards this as impossible, 
since descriptive metaphysics is in the right and revisionary 
metaphysics in the wrong (2012: 220-1). 
The idea of a profound meta-philosophical rift appears prima 
facie plausible. 4  D’Oro points out that Collingwood was both a 
descriptive metaphysician avant la lettre and an inspiration for 
analytic hermeneuticians like Dray (2012: 217-20). A meta-
philosophical explanation of the philosophical controversy also 
chimes with the contrast between the Wittgensteinian roots of 
teleology on the one hand, and the Quinean roots of causalism on 
the other. Davidson’s rejection of teleology seems to fit in with 
other naturalistic attacks on a tenet uniting Wittgenstein with 
conceptual analysis, namely that there is a fundamental divide 
between science and philosophy, factual/empirical and 
conceptual/a priori investigations, notably Quine’s repudiation of 
the analytic/synthetic distinction and Putnam’s attack on the 
criteria/symptom dichtotomy. Finally, D’Oro rightly points out 
that causalists like Jaegwon Kim take issue with certain 
methodological-cum-meta-philosophical ideas and attitudes of 
teleologists. Nevertheless her meta-philosophical diagnosis is 
inaccurate in several respects. 
                                                          
4  This paragraph is indebted to Tripodi (2014). But my meta-diagnosis of the meta-
philosophical diagnosis differs from his and is more sceptical. 
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For one thing, causalists like Kim do not reject teleological 
approaches simply on meta-philosophical grounds, independently 
of “first-order” philosophical arguments like that of Davidson. 
Their meta-philosophical complaints are a mirror image of D’Oro’s 
own: they are designed to explain and criticize the refusal of the 
opposition to see the philosophical light. 
For another, the descriptivism D’Oro attributes to the 
teleologists and subscribes to herself is an uneasy mixture of at least 
three distinct ideas (2012: 210-212, 217). First, there is the 
descriptivist project of delineating our actual conceptual scheme 
instead of revising it according to the presumed dictates of the 
nature of reality. Secondly, there are “common-sense” claims, 
presumably considered beliefs firmly held by laypeople, as opposed 
to the views advanced by scientists, philosophers, religious leaders, 
etc. Thirdly, there is “folk-psychology”, our everyday mental 
discourse and the mental concepts it employs, notably that of 
beliefs, desires and intentions, as opposed to the 
neurophysiological discourse that eliminativist materialists would 
like to put in its place. Contrary to a commonly held view, folk 
psychology does not constitute a scientific or proto-scientific 
theory of human behaviour. Unlike common sense, it is a network 
of concepts rather than beliefs (Glock 2013). What is more, 
common-sense views need not conform to the findings of 
descriptive metaphysics / conceptual analysis, since they may be 
guided by an inadequate grasp of the conceptual landscape – by the 
“surface” rather than the “depth-grammar” of expressions (PI 
§464). It may well be commonplace, for instance, to regard the 
mind as a thing and having a pain as a relation of ownership to a 
private sensation. For better or worse, conceptual analysis does not 
equate to common sense. By a similar token, for Wittgenstein at 
least, what people are inclined to say is the starting-point rather 
than the final word for sober philosophizing (PI §254). 
Keeping these different kinds of descriptivism / anti-
revisionism apart sheds light on the crucial weakness of D’Oro’s 
meta-philosophical diagnosis. The meta-philosophical conflict 
between teleologists and causalists like Jerry Fodor only concerns 
the merits of descriptive metaphysics / conceptual analysis. It 
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specifically does not include the merits of folk-psychology. Both 
Davidson and Fodor share a goal with the teleologists, namely that 
of explaining folk-psychology rather than reforming or abolishing 
it. Fodor’s notorious appeals to “granny” also manifest his 
proximity to common-sense, at least regarding the existence and 
centrality of beliefs and desires. And the aforequoted first sentence 
of ARC makes it abundantly clear that Davidson regards himself as 
spelling out common sense and its presuppositions rather than as 
debunking it. 
D’Oro herself willy-nilly admits as much. For she takes pains to 
dispute the claims of causalism to be in line with common sense 
(e.g. 2012: 217). That, however, is a philosophical dispute about our 
extant mental concepts and common-sense psychological beliefs, 
rather than a meta-philosophical dispute about the role that these 
concepts and beliefs should play in philosophy. Finally, while 
D’Oro is right in denying that either common sense or our mental 
notions imply causalism, she is wrong in maintaining that there is a 
“common-sensical distinction between actions and events”; instead 
there is common-sensical distinction, well documented by empirical 
psychology, between two kinds of events – those that result from 
agency and those that do not. She is also wrong in contending that 
common sense would accept the Humean claim according to which 
causal relations boil down to explanatory relations rather than 
being real relations. On these points Davidson is closer to common 
sense and our extant conceptual scheme, not than teleologists in 
general, but than D’Oro’s heroes Collingwood and Dray. 
6. Naturalism 
The conflict between teleologists and causalists is not one between 
friends and foes of common sense or folk psychology. But these 
contrasts are not the only meta-philosophical rifts that bear on the 
reasons and causes debate. More important still is that between 
naturalism and its discontents, which D’Oro mentions only in 
passing. So perhaps a slightly different meta-philosophical 
diagnosis hits the target. One of the widely perceived advantages of 
causalism is held to be that it is congenial to what friends and foes 
alike label “the project of naturalising intentional action”. As 
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regards ontology, it seems to dispense with the need to postulate 
entities beyond the physical realm that nonetheless have the power 
to cause changes within that realm. As regards epistemology and 
methodology, it seems to dispense with the need to assume a 
distinct way of making sense of phenomena that transcends the 
supremely successful and reasonably well understood causal 
explanations employed by the natural sciences. Finally, as regards 
meta-philosophy, it is hospitable to the Quinean idea that the 
philosophical investigation of agency is part of, or at least 
continuous with, its empirical investigation by the special sciences. 
Because of Quine, many contemporary analytic philosophers, 
especially in the US, feel almost contractually obliged to profess 
allegiance to naturalism. This includes staunch defenders of folk-
psychology like Fodor. Ironically, however, Davidson may be a 
heretical exception to this rule, in spirit if not letter. And nowhere 
more so than in the philosophy of mind and action, his status as an 
inspiration for physicalism notwithstanding. Admittedly, Davidson 
denies that there is a clear line between philosophy and science on 
account of rejecting the analytic/synthetic distinction. This official 
meta-philosophical naturalism puts him at odds with Wittgenstein. 
Throughout his career, Wittgenstein sharply distinguished between 
the “logical”, “grammatical” or “conceptual” problems and 
investigations of philosophy and the “factual” problems and 
investigations of empirical science (e.g. TLP 4.122ff.; Z §452). In 
practice, however, Davidson does not advance a scientistic 
metaphilosophy. If anything, he regards the blurring of the line 
between philosophy and science as a license to put in perspective 
the philosophical relevance of neurophysiological findings (1980: 
216). Contrasting rhetoric notwithstanding, this is not a million 
miles away from Wittgenstein’s critical engagement with 
psychology (see PI II 232; RPP I §§1039, 1093). What is more, 
Davidson’s repudiation of the analytic/synthetic distinction is 
incompatible with his idea that the standards of rationality 
enshrined in his principle of charity are constitutive of phenomena 
like thought, agency and language. Behaviour which completely 
defies being interpreted as conforming to these standards simply 
does not qualify as intentional or as linguistic. Davidson himself 
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was eventually forced to concede that it “cannot be a factual 
question” whether a creature with thoughts is approximately rational 
(1985a: 245). This chimes with Wittgenstein’s suggestion that the so-
called “laws of thought” are partly constitutive of what we call 
“reasoning”, “thinking”, and “language” (RFM 80-95, 336). 
On occasion, Davidson calls himself a naturalized 
epistemologist. But what he underwrites is only a “resolutely third 
person approach to epistemology” (2001: 159, 194). Such an 
approach is not tied to the transformation of epistemology into 
physiological psychology that Quine envisaged. In fact, Davidson 
complains that the latter is inimical to a third-person perspective 
and that it runs together the physiological causes of our beliefs with 
their epistemic grounds. Whether these animadversions are 
compatible with Davidson’s causalism is a moot question (see 
section 14). 
As we have seen, Davidson is precisely not a revisionist à la 
Quine. He is an anti-revisionist, albeit of a variety close to the early 
rather than later Wittgenstein, in that he regards natural languages 
and ordinary discourse as structured by logical calculi. This 
difference is important to Davidson’s theory of action. He derives 
ontological conclusions about the nature of actions – notably that 
they are events – from what he takes to be the logical form of 
action sentences and, more generally, of adverbial modifications 
(1980: ch. 6). At the same time, Davidson does not rely exclusively 
on formalisation. His theory of action also features acute 
observations about established patterns of use. In certain respects, 
Davidson is a conceptual analysist malgré lui. This comes out not 
just in his astute criticisms of certain versions of agent causation, 
but also in his famous challenge to anti-causalists, to account for 
the distinction we standardly draw between a reason for A to  
and the reason for which A -ed (1980: 9-10). 
This last point also indicates why it is not just inaccurate but 
also counterproductive to blame the persisting disagreement 
between causalists and anti-causalists on underlying meta-
philosophical divergences. It shifts the bone of contention onto a 
plane where it becomes even less tractable. As Wittgenstein 
emphasized (PI §121; see Glock 1996: 243-247), meta-
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philosophical disputes are not disputes outside of philosophy; 
instead, they revolve around “first-order” philosophical issues – 
often in philosophical logic, philosophy of language and 
epistemology. Since any stance concerning these issues in turn 
depends on certain philosophical methods and hence on certain 
meta-philosophical ideas, we are faced with a potentially vicious 
circularity. Even leaving that threat aside, meta-philosophical 
debates tend to draw on a complex syndrome of ideas from diverse 
areas. That makes them even less amenable to consensual solution 
than less abstract and fundamental controversies. Tying causalism 
and anti-causalism ab initio to contrasting meta-philosophies renders 
them more incommensurable than necessary. Viewing the 
controversy between them in the first instance from a closer angle 
may bracket underlying divergences that ultimately need to be 
addressed. But it has the advantage of focusing on the close-quarter 
exchange of observations and arguments concerning the primary 
topic of the debate. 
7. Shared Ideas in the Philosophy of Mind 
There is a context to that debate which is wider than the theory of 
action yet narrower than meta-philosophy, namely the philosophy 
of mind. We therefore need to consider whether divergent views 
about the role of causation in action derive from incompatible 
assumptions about the nature of the mind. As regards mainstream 
proponents of the standard story, this is indeed the case. As 
mentioned above, to them part of the attraction of causalism lies in 
its prospects for construing both actions and reasons as purely 
physical phenomena, the former spatially external, the latter 
spatially internal to the agent. 
As regards Davidson himself, however, the picture is more 
complicated. I already dwelled on his third-person perspective (see 
also Stoutland 2010: 64). Such a perspective militates against 
reifying the mind as a kind of entity – be it a Cartesian soul or the 
brain – and favours linking mental phenomena to agents, their 
behaviour and abilities. As a result, Davidson’s anomalous monism 
is much closer to Wittgenstein than commonly recognized. It is 
“ontological monism coupled with conceptual dualism”. Davidson 
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tries to reconcile the naturalistic (anti-Platonist and anti-Cartesian) 
claim that there is no realm beyond the physical with a recognition 
that mental and semantic discourse is neither reducible to nor 
replaceable by the idiom of natural science. “There are no such 
things as minds, but people have mental properties... These 
properties are constantly changing, and such changes are mental 
events” (1994: 231; see 1999b: 599). 
The key to Davidson’s position is his ontology of events. Like 
material bodies, events are particulars that can be described in 
fundamentally different ways. Unlike material bodies, events are 
dated occurrences with definite durations, like the Olympic Games 
of 1992 or Brutus’ stabbing of Caesar. They can be described in 
fundamentally different ways, namely through both mental and 
physical concepts. Some events have true descriptions in 
psychological terms and are hence mental. But all events, including 
the mental ones, also have true physical descriptions and are hence 
physical. Thus my coming to believe that p has a mental 
description, e.g. as based on my belief that q; but it also has a 
physical description. The two descriptions pick out the same event; 
indeed, every particular mental event is identical with a particular 
physical event. 
But although there is token-token identity between mental and 
physical events, there can be no type-type identity: there are no 
psychophysical laws that correlate mental events under their mental 
description (“coming to believe that p”) with physical events under 
their physical description (“-fibres firing”). Davidson’s argument 
in favour of this claim rests on two ideas. First, the principal 
purpose of mental discourse is to explain behaviour by reference to 
propositional attitudes such as believing that p, desiring x and 
intending to . Secondly, this kind of explanation is characterized 
by two features which are constitutive of mental discourse yet 
absent from physical discourse – normativity and holism (1980: 
chs. 11-12). 
Mental discourse is normative. Mental states are subject to 
those principles of rationality which a radical interpreter guided by 
the principle of charity imputes to the speakers she interprets. 
Hans-Johann Glock  BY-NC-SA 
 26 
These principles (explored in logic and decision theory) specify 
what it is reasonable to believe or desire. One such principle is: 
(P) If you prefer x to y and y to z, then you should prefer x to z. 
Mental discourse is holistic in that propositional attitudes do not 
occur in isolation. One cannot attribute a propositional attitude to a 
person independently of attributing other propositional attitudes to 
her. This is not just an epistemological constraint, but due to the 
nature of propositional attitudes. The logical connections between 
propositional attitudes are partly constitutive of their identity: what 
makes the belief that p the belief it is, is at least in part its 
interconnection with other beliefs. 
Now suppose that there are psychophysical laws which connect 
preferring x to y and y to z with neural state m and preferring x to z 
with neural state n. This law should enable us to infer from (P) that 
if someone is in neural state m he should also be in neural state n. 
But the only kind of “should” which has a place in physics is one 
of behaving in line with expectations supported by empirical 
evidence, not a normative injunction like (P). Equally, this 
psychophysical law, in conjunction with a physical law according to 
which anyone in neural state m is also in neural state n, should allow 
us to predict that whenever someone prefers x to y and y to z he 
prefers x to z. But because of the holistic nature of thought, the 
attribution of that last preference may run counter to normative 
constraints. For example, if we have independent reasons to ascribe 
a preference of z to x, it lumbers the subject with contradictory 
preferences. Accordingly, physical and mental predicates cannot 
feature in psychophysical laws because of “the disparate 
commitments of the mental and the physical schemes” (1980: 222). 
Two language-games not to be crossed, as Wittgenstein would put 
it (RFM 117-8). 
In Davidson’s view, “the mental is not an ontological but a 
conceptual category” (2004: 46). His conceptual dualism and 
refusal to reify mental notions includes reasons for actions. 
Beliefs, desires and intentions belong to no ontology … . When we 
ascribe attitudes [like believing, desiring and intending something], we 
are using the mental vocabulary to describe people. Beliefs and 
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intentions are not little entities lodged in the brain. (1999b: 654; see 
also 2001: 60)  
According to Davidson, there is an analogy between saying that a 
subject thinks that p and that a subject weighs n kg (2001: ch. 4; on 
the measurement analogy see also Beckermann 1996; Matthews 
2007.) When we ascribe a weight to a person, we do not ascribe to 
them a genuine relation to an abstract object. Rather, we ascribe to 
the person a relation to other material objects, for instance that it 
would be in balance with 60 litres of water. Mutatis mutandis for the 
case of belief. In ascribing a belief to a person, we ultimately 
describe and explain their actual or possible behaviour. We place 
the subject not in a relation to a genuine object, but in the context 
of a system of describing and explaining the subject’s behaviour 
and behavioural capacities. In the final analysis, so-called 
propositional attitudes are to be elucidated in terms of what 
subjects think or say, or, more accurately still, could think or say. In 
sum: there is a striking though surprisingly unappreciated proximity 
between Davidson’s approach on the one hand, and Wittgenstein’s 
insistence on the conceptual connection between the mental and 
behavioural capacities and his idea that mental predicates apply 
first, foremost and literally to human beings rather than to souls or 
parts of bodies, the brain included (PI §281). 
8. Davidson and analytic hermeneutics 
The gap between Wittgenstein and Davidson in the philosophy of 
mind is too narrow to render Wittgensteinian teleology and 
Davidsonian causalism incommensurable. Even in the theory of 
action, the two are closer than commonly recognized, even on a 
fairly orthodox construal.5 In fact, Davidson is a bona fide member 
of analytic hermeneutics. This is no coincidence, given his 
intellectual biography (see 1999a: 12-27). It derives partly from his 
interest in literature and history as an undergraduate and from his 
study of ancient philosophy – notably Plato and Aristotle – as a 
graduate student. In the course of writing his PhD dissertation on 
                                                          
5 For an unorthodox interpretation that assimilates the two even more see Stoutland 2007. 
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the Philebus he came to appreciate an essay by Gadamer. Much later 
Davidson devoted an article to this essay, and there are brief yet 
respectful criticisms of Gadamer in his last writings (2005: 181, 
252; ch. 18). More importantly, Davidson knew most of the British 
representatives of analytic hermeneutics, including Ryle, 
Anscombe, Hampshire and Kenny. He invited several of them to 
Stanford in the 1950s and spent a year at Oxford in 1973. Qualms 
about “small red books” notwithstanding, he admired much in 
their work. On the back cover of the 2000 reissue he lauded 
Anscombe’s Intention as “the most important treatment of action 
since Aristotle”. And he would have readily conceded that it was 
Wittgenstein, Ryle and their followers who re-established the 
theory of action as a flourishing discipline. 
As regards doctrinal matters, Davidson combines the 
hermeneutic idea that actions are explained by the reasons for 
which agents perform them with a causal theory, according to 
which actions are caused by those reasons – or the events of those 
reasons coming into existence – and explained in a causal fashion. 
Both actions and the reasons that explain them are among those 
events that have both a physical and a mental description. Under 
their physical descriptions, the action can be seen to be caused by its 
reason. At the same time, there is no strict causal law which relates 
action and reason as described in mental terms. For which mental 
descriptions hold for these events depends on considerations of 
rationality that are qualitatively distinct from physical 
considerations. 
As a result of his conceptual dualism, Davidson also endorses 
the methodological dualism of hermeneutics: “there is an 
irreducible difference between psychological explanations that 
involve the propositional attitudes and explanations in sciences like 
physics and physiology” (2004: 101). He also subscribes to 
Collingwood’s view that “the methodology of history (or, for that 
matter, any of the social sciences that treat individual social 
behaviour) differs markedly from the methodology of the natural 
sciences” (2005: 282). 
In summary, for Davidson, human beings and their actions are 
physical; yet they cannot be properly understood by physics, but 
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only by appeal to reasons and rationality. He shares Quine’s 
predilection for a monistic ontology, but not for a scientistic 
methodology. In this way, he seeks to pay the ontological homage 
that philosophy owes to modern science, without denying the 
distinctive character of human beings. However, the devil lies in 
the details of this combination. There Davidson diverges from 
Wittgenstein, but even more so from some of the small red books. 
It is to them and to Davidson’s riposte that we must now turn. 
9. The Teleological Arguments against Causalism 
ARC explicitly defends causalism against five, partly 
interconnected, arguments 
a. States vs. events: Reasons consist of attitudes and beliefs, and 
these are states or dispositions; yet only events can be 
efficient causes. 
b. Logical connection: The connection between an action and 
the reason for which it is done is logical or conceptual rather 
than empirical. The two cannot be stated independently of 
one another, by contrast to the relata of a causal relation as 
conceived in the Humean paradigm. 
c. Absence of causal laws: There are no causal laws connecting 
intention and action. By contrast, an event A can cause an 
event B only if events of type A are connected with events of 
type B by a general law. 
d. First-person authority: By and large, agents have first-person 
authority about the reasons for which they acted. I.e. what 
they sincerely claim to be their reason is what we call their 
reason. By contrast, their statements of the causes of their 
actions enjoy no special authority; they are no more than 
fallible hypotheses. 
e. The problem of the missing agent: If reasons were inner 
events causing the action, the agent would be a helpless 
victim rather than the author of the action. 
(b) – (e) appear in writings by Wittgensteinian teleologists. They 
also have resonances in Wittgenstein’s own work. This is not to say 
that Wittgenstein subscribed or would have subscribed to all of 
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them. He condoned versions of (c) and (d), yet in a way that is not 
as irreconcilable with Davidson as one might suspect. He did not 
advance (b); indeed, his account of logical connections implies that 
(b) is fallacious. I shall disregard (e), which is related to 
Wittgenstein’s Schopenhauerian animadversions against the 
empiricist idea that “willing too is merely an experience” (see Glock 
1999; Candlish 2001). Instead, I shall consider (b) – (d) in the light 
of Wittgenstein’s own reflections on agency and causation. In the 
final sections I turn to the connection between (a) and a 
Wittgensteinian objection not mentioned in ARC, namely the 
distinction between causal explanation and rational justification. 
10. Davidson’s Wittgensteinian Critique of the Logical 
Connection Argument 
The logical connection argument received its emblematic – though 
not exemplary – formulation by Melden. According to Melden, a 
lesson from Hume is that a cause “must be distinct from the 
alleged effect”. Yet the connection between the reason for an 
action and the action is logical: the reason for -ing is identified as 
the reason it is through being a reason for -ing, i.e. through the 
action for which it is a reason (1961: 52-3). Melden illustrates his 
objection through the example of a driver raising his arm in order 
to signal that he is taking a turn. “If ... the motive were some event 
either concurrent with or antecedent to the action of raising the 
arm, there would needs be a logically necessary connection between 
two distinct events – the alleged motive and the action, however it 
is described. This is impossible if the sequence motive  action is 
a causal relation” (1961: 89). 
Davidson renders the argument as follows: “Since a reason 
makes an action intelligible by redescribing it, we do not have two 
events, but only one under different descriptions, while causal 
relations (in the Humean sense) demand two distinct events” 
(1980: 13-4). He raises two main objections. 
First, a cause differs from its effect; but a reason also differs 
from the action it rationalizes. For one thing, they differ as regards 
their categorial status: “reasons, being beliefs and attitudes, are 
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certainly not identical with actions”, which are events (1980:10). 
For another, they differ as individual phenomena. It is perfectly 
possible, for instance, to want or intend to turn on a light without 
actually doing so.6 
Both responses are compelling. However, they leave intact a 
different version of the logical connection argument. von Wright 
accommodates the second point by granting that the logical 
connection between the reason and the action obtains only ex post 
actu (1971: 116-7, see 93-4, 107). At the same time, he insists that 
the connection between the premises and the conclusion of a 
practical inference is conceptual/logical rather than 
empirical/causal. If an agent wants or intends to  at t, she will do 
so, unless she is somehow prevented from -ing at t. Anscombe 
puts the point as follows: “the primitive sign of wanting is trying to 
get” (1957: §36). In Wittgenstein’s own terms: even though one can 
want or intend to  without actually -ing, -ing or trying to  is 
a criterion rather than a symptom of wanting or intending to . The 
terms “wanting to ” and “intending to ” would not mean what 
they do, unless A’s failing to try to  under propitious 
circumstances constituted evidence, however defeasible, against “A 
wants/intends to ”.7 
This marks an important difference between the way we 
standardly talk about the relation between reason and action on the 
one hand, and the way we talk about the relation between relations 
of efficient causation. Yet for reasons mentioned in section 3 it 
does not rule out that reasons are causes (causalism about reasons), 
and hence it is also compatible with a causalism about explanation 
that insists that intentional explanations refer to efficient causes, 
albeit in a conceptually distinct manner. 
                                                          
6 This riposte is standardly imputed to ARC (e.g. Davis 2010: 37). But it is only implicit on 
pp. 14-5. 
7 For the pertinent features of Wittgenstein’s account of criteria for mental concepts in 
general see Glock 2001: 9-12. Wittgenstein did not apply this account to the case of 
wanting in the way advocated here. Waismann (1983: 12-5, 36-40) does not employ the 
notion of criteria, yet comes close in other respects, through his modifications of 
Schopenhauer’s dictum Der Wille ist die Tat (“the will is the deed”).  
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This is where Davidson’s second response comes in (1980: 14-
15). The logical connection argument assumes that causal relations 
are factual rather that logical. But consider the synthetic truth 
(1) A caused B 
Since the cause of B = A, we can move to the analytic 
(2) The cause of B caused B.8 
The logical status of a statement linking events as analytic or 
synthetic depends not on the events themselves, but on how they are 
described. The same holds for the difference in explanatory value between 
(1) and (2). Two events can be logically related under one pair of 
descriptions, while at the same time being factually related under 
another pair. Speaking less loosely, one can describe A and B 
correctly in different ways, such that some descriptions of A are 
logically related to some descriptions of B, while other descriptions 
of A are not logically related to other descriptions of B. As a result, 
the fact that two events can be described in a way that relates them 
logically is no bar to them also being related as cause and effect. 
Indeed, redescribing events in terms of their causes is as much part 
of ordinary discourse as redescribing actions in terms of their 
reasons. "Suppose that someone was injured. We could redescribe 
this event ‘in terms of a cause’ by saying he was burned" (1963: 10). 
Both of Davidson’s responses employ conceptual analysis to 
good effect. Furthermore, far from being incompatible with 
Wittgenstein, the second response starts out from a bona fide 
Wittgensteinian idea (Glock 1996: 75-6, 129-35, 198-202). 
Davidson stresses that logical relations are not de re but de dicto, i.e. 
due to the way we describe things, rather than to mind- or 
language-independent necessities. The idea can be classified as 
conventionalist, and in Davidson it combines Quinean and 
Wittgensteinian influences. Although Quine rejected de re 
                                                          
8 The cause of B caused B is not analytic, because there might not have been any cause of 
B, Miguel Hoeltje demurred. But one can reformulate (2) as “If anything caused B, then 
the cause of B caused B”. And that is analytic. It exemplifies a valid pattern: “If anything 
V-ed X, the thing that V-ed X V-ed X”. Furthermore, in the spirit of Strawson one 
should insist that talk of “the cause of B” presupposes that B had a cause. 
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necessities, he did not adumbrate de dicto necessities, instead 
rejecting necessity altogether. At least in ARC Davidson accepts de 
dicto necessities. He could have inherited that idea from Carnap, but 
the latter in turn got it from Wittgenstein. In any event, it is more 
probable that Davidson imbibed it from Anscombe’s emphasis on 
actions having intentional properties “under a description” (1959: 
11-12). It allows Davidson to accept that the way we describe 
reasons and actions in rationalizations is unique, while nonetheless 
holding that these rationalizations refer to efficient causes and their 
effects. 
11. The Absence of Causal Laws 
(b) maintains that general laws are implied by causal explanations, 
yet not by intentional explanations. It concludes not just that 
rationalisations differ from causal explanations (contrary to 
causalism about explanation), but also that reasons are not causes 
(contrary to causalism about reasons). While Davidson accepts the 
first half of the premise, he rejects the second and hence the 
conclusion. Just as his later anomalous monism revolves around 
the idea that there are no psychophysical laws, ARC denies that 
there are psychological laws connecting beliefs, desires etc. with 
actions. There are “rough laws”, “generalisations connecting 
reasons and actions”, yet these cannot be sharpened into strict 
predictive laws. However, this “does not inhibit valid causal 
explanation, or few causal explanations could be made. I am certain 
the window broke because it was struck by a rock – I saw it all 
happen; but I am not (is anyone?) in command of laws on the basis 
of which I can predict what blows will break which windows” 
(1980: 15-16). “Singular causal statements” like “A causes B” do 
not imply a “particular law involving the predicates used in the 
descriptions ‘A’ and ‘B’”, i.e. a law of the form “Events of type A 
are followed by events of type B”. At this point, Davidson departs 
from Hume. But he has the later Wittgenstein on his side. 
Like Davidson, Wittgenstein accepts one feature of the 
Humean view: causal relations are external, i.e. obtain between 
logically independent events (PI §220; Z §296). And like Davidson, 
he rejects another feature, the nomological account of causal 
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explanations: not all causal explanations are underpinned by general 
connections between types of events. There is an irreducible variety 
of prototypes of causal connections, including: (i) impact (collision of 
billiard-balls); (ii) traction (pulling a string); (iii) mechanisms like 
clocks, which combine (i) and (ii); (iv) human reactions to 
sensations or emotions (being hit on the head or frightened by 
someone's facial expression); (v) statements which are based on 
observing regular successions of events. Since Wittgenstein stresses 
both the variety of cases and the fact that we use the same word he 
arguably regards “cause” as a family resemblance concept. He 
denies not only that the Humean paradigm (v) is the only prototype 
of causation, but also that it is the fundamental one. And he does 
so in a way that is very close to the passage from Davidson just 
quoted. The “cause-effect language game” of everyday life is rooted 
not in observation or experimentation revealing general laws, but in 
a practice, which in turn is based on certain primitive reactions. For 
example, we react to a painful blow by pointing to someone and 
saying “He did it” (CE 409-10, 416-7, 420, 433). The crucial lesson 
for us: the basic cases of causal explanations are those of singular 
causation, which do not require general laws.9 
A difference between Wittgenstein and Davidson emerges 
elsewhere. Davidson accepts a “weaker” version of Hume’s 
nomological account of causation. (1) does entail “that there exists 
a causal law instantiated by some true descriptions of A and B”. This 
weaker version “suits rationalizations equally well”. If a s because 
a desires that p and believes that -ing will bring it about that p, 
then there exists a strict causal law at the neurophysiological level 
connecting the onslaught in a of the pro-attitude / belief causation 
and a’s bodily movement (1980: 16-7). 
This is the message of Davidson’s anomalous monism, but one 
to which Wittgenstein would be deaf. He is committed to denying 
that a causal relation can obtain only if there is some causal law – 
                                                          
9 Tripodi points out that Anscombe (1971) is close to Davidson on this score, since she 
accepts not just non-necessitating causes but also singular causation. Both ideas go back to 
Wittgenstein (Glock 1996: 72-4).  
 
Nordic Wittgenstein Review 3 (No. 1) 2014 
  35 
however unknown or even unknowable – connecting A and B. 
This is implied by his animadversions against the idea that 
whenever an effect occurs in one case but not in an apparently 
similar case, there must be some relevant further differences, even 
though for reasons of principle we may never be in a position to 
identify it. In the case of two apparently identical plant-seeds which 
produce different kinds of plants, Wittgenstein avers, there need not 
be any difference in the seeds underlying these different 
dispositions. We could and should treat the origin of these seeds 
not just as the basis for a prediction (“Seeds from a type A-plant 
will produce type A-plants”), but add “... because they are from type 
A-plants”. Wittgenstein gives the impression that the origin could 
furnish not just a bona fide causal explanation, which is in line with 
Davidson’s aforequoted passage, but the ultimate explanation 
which captures all there is to the causal relation. And he writes: “If 
this upsets our concepts of causation, it is high time they were 
upset” (Z §§608-10; see CE pp. 410-11, 433-4; LPP 100-1). 
This line of reasoning is not compelling. By Wittgenstein’s own 
lights, philosophy has no business “upsetting”, i.e. revising our 
notions of causation. In this passage, he appears to be less of a 
descriptivist and conceptual analyst than Davidson (once more, 
contrary to d’Oro’s meta-philosophical diagnosis). Furthermore, 
even if there were nothing unintelligible in supposing that there is no 
structural difference between the two seeds, accepting phenomenal 
properties (concerning the origin of the seeds) as ultimate causes 
would mean abandoning a highly successful principle of the 
physical sciences. It would be on a par with accepting that 
astrological explanations capture the ultimate factors shaping our 
destinies, provided that they are backed by statistical evidence. But 
even if it should turn out, for example, that people born between 
between 21 January and 18 February have an above average IQ, it 
would be irrational to insist that this fact was brought about by the 
fact that these people were born under the sign of Aquarius. 
12. First-Person Authority 
Anti-causalist argument (c) runs: an agent knows of her own 
reasons for acting infallibly, without induction or observation; yet 
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knowledge of ordinary causal relations is fallible; hence intentional 
explanations differ from causal explanations and reasons are not 
causes. ARC accepts the first premise, with qualifications. 
Davidson points out that agents can be wrong about the reasons 
for which they acted, in cases in which they have more than one 
reason. But like the Wittgensteinian teleologists he denies that “in 
general it makes sense to ask you how you know what your reasons 
were or to ask for evidence” (18). At the same time he rejects the 
conclusions, since he does not accept the second premise. 
Induction or observation is “not the only way of knowing” that a 
causal law exists and hence of knowing that a causal relation 
obtains. 
That final conclusion, at least, is once more in line with 
Wittgenstein, for reasons connected with those concerning singular 
causation sketched above. According to Hume we can never 
directly observe a causal connection, but only a succession of 
events; consequently our causal statements must be based on 
observing a regular sequence of parallel events and are always 
provisional, subject to refutation by subsequent observations. 
Wittgenstein follows Russell in holding that there are causal 
relations which we know immediately, while rejecting the idea that 
this is based on intuition (CE 409, 431; LC 22). Recognizing the 
most basic forms of causation, especially those involving direct 
physical contact (i)-(iv), does not depend on observing constant 
regularities or on experiments. We directly observe one thing acting 
upon another, and know the cause immediately, though not 
infallibly. Both are paradigmatic cases of what we call a cause, and 
constitutive of the idea of a causal nexus (CE 408-10, 416, 420, 
433). 
Acknowledging the possibility of non-inductive, non-
observational knowledge of singular causal connections is 
compatible with insisting that as regards her intentional actions, an 
agent does not have the kind of authoritative knowledge of their 
causes as she does of their reasons. It is noteworthy, however, that 
Anscombe, in applying Wittgenstein’s idea of immediate causal 
knowledge to the case of agency, accepts that agents can have 
immediate knowledge of the causes of certain things they do. She 
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reckons with such a thing as a “mental cause”, “what someone 
would describe if he were asked the specific question: what 
produced this action or thought or feeling on your part: what did 
you see or hear or feel, or what ideas or images cropped up in your 
mind, and led up to it?”. For instance, when asked “Why did you 
knock the cup off the table?” one might respond “I saw such-and-
such and it made me jump”. Anscombe rightly notes that we know 
these things authoritatively, “without observation” (1957: 16-18).  
On the one hand, Anscombe wants to distinguish such mental 
causes from motives and intentions. On the other hand, she writes: 
Intentional actions are a sub-class of the events in a man’s history 
which are known to him not because he observes them. In this wider 
class is included one type of involuntary actions, which is marked off 
by the fact that mental causality is excluded from it; and mental 
causality is itself characterized by being known without observation. 
But intentional actions are not marked off just by being subject to 
mental causality, since there are involuntary actions from which 
mental causality is not excluded (1957: 24, cp. 18-9). 
This passage strongly suggests that intentional actions are a sub-
class of actions brought about by mental causality; otherwise it 
would have to read somewhat as follows: “intentional actions are 
marked off by not being subject to mere mental causation”. If this 
reading is correct, Anscombe was a Davidsonian avant la lettre. 
13. Explanation vs. Justification 
There is one Wittgensteinian argument that Davidson does not 
mention in ARC, presumably because it does not loom large in the 
writings of the Wittgensteinian teleologists. This is surprising, since 
the objection is rather straightforward. It concerns the contrast 
between justification and explanation. A mental state or process – 
e.g. of believing or coming to believe that p – may causally explain 
an action, but it cannot provide a justification for that action.  
The contrast between explanation and justification was 
originally pinpointed in Kant’s distinction between quaestio facti and 
quaestio iuris and the ensuing Neo-Kantian distinction between 
“genesis” and “validity”. It has fuelled a pervasive, if largely 
implicit, suspicion of the so-called “genetic fallacy”, the mistake of 
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deducing claims about the validity of a statement or the content of a 
concept from information about the causes of its emergence (see 
Glock 2014; Glock 2008: 100-103). My conjecture is that Frege 
imbibed it from Neo-Kantianism and passed it on to Wittgenstein 
and Waismann. In Frege, this Kantian anti-geneticism was 
combined with a distinction that concurrently emerged within the 
phenomenological tradition, namely between a mental act and its 
object, or, more appositely, between a mental state or process like 
that of believing or desiring and its content – that which is believed 
or desired. In many cases, at least, one should further distinguish 
that content of the believing from its object(s) – what the believing 
is about. When A believes that the cat is on the mat, that the cat is on 
the mat is the content of A’s believing, whereas the cat and the mat are 
its objects. 
In his attempt from the 1930s to summarize Wittgenstein’s 
position, Waismann applied the explanation/justification 
dichotomy to the theory of action – the activity of following a rule 
– by availing himself of a specific case of that distinction. 
The attending to the rule can indeed be the cause for the rule being 
followed. … [But] the cause of an action can never be referred to, to 
justify the action. I may justify a calculation by appealing to the laws of 
arithmetic, but not by appealing to my attending to these laws. The 
one is a justification, the other a causal explanation. (Waismann 1965: 
123) 
What could be invoked as a reason, as a justification of that person's 
action, is not the attending to the rule, but the rule attended to. More 
generally, the reason for an agent’s action is not the believing or 
desiring, but the content of the believing or desiring. The reason for A’s 
-ing is not A’s believing or desiring that p, but just that p. And 
that is not a mental cause of A’s -ing, simply because it not a 
mental phenomenon at all. 
Wittgenstein himself employed a distinction between the causes 
and the contents of believing and desiring in his discussions of 
intentionality in general and of aesthetic judgments in particular. 
He also linked this distinction to the idea that the reasons for a 
belief, unlike its causes, are what is believed. “When I am asked for 
Nordic Wittgenstein Review 3 (No. 1) 2014 
  39 
a reason for the belief, what is expected, as part of the answer, is 
what I believe” (AWL 28).10 
Tripodi (2014) detects this point in Anscombe, though only in 
nuce.11 Be that as it may, it has become central to the current debate. 
Contrary to a prevailing impression, the causalist consensus 
established by ARC has recently been challenged. Its Achilles-heel 
is precisely the claim that reasons are mental phenomena rather 
than objective facts or presumed facts. At present, two contrasting 
positions about reasons for action confront each other. First, there 
is an account which can be labelled psychologistic, psychological, 
internal or subjectivist. According to this subjectivist conception, 
(S) A s for a reason iff A’s -ing is to be explained by reference 
to mental states of A (beliefs and “pro-attitudes” like desires and 
intentions). 
Subjectivism insists that the beliefs and desires invoked in 
intentional explanations are mental states of the agent – states of 
desiring or wanting something and states of believing something. 
By contrast, according to a revisionist position that is currently 
gaining in momentum, the reasons for which agents act are not 
mental states of the agent herself. Instead, they are objective facts or 
states of affairs, facts which, save for special cases, concern the 
agent’s environment rather than her own mind. In so far as the 
reasons for which an agent acts can be said to be beliefs and desires 
at all, they are not subjective states of believing or desiring, but what 
is believed or what is desired. An agent A acts for a reason if A acts on 
account not of her own beliefs, but on account of facts, on account 
of how things are (from A’s perspective). Accordingly, 
(O)  A s for a reason iff A acts in the light of reasons, that is, in 
the light of facts (as A sees them). 
                                                          
10  I am grateful to Matthieu Queloz. His MA thesis reminded me of the first point 
(discussed in  Glock 1996: 185-6, 33-4) and alerted me to the striking passage from AWL. 
Queloz also cites other passages, but they are either far less explicit or variants of the 
passage from Waismann 1965 hailing from VW.   
11 As regards “backward looking motives” like revenge, Anscombe writes: "something that 
has happened ... is given as the ground of an action" (1957, § 13). For instance, the reason 
A gives for an act of revenge against B is the fact that B killed A’s brother. 
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Subjectivism goes back at least to Hume, and the “standard story” 
closely associates its present manifestations with Davidson. 
However, that attribution is far from obvious. To see why, it helps 
to look at the anti-causalist argument (a) considered in ARC. 
14. Reasons, Beliefs and “Onslaughts” 
Although this argument is congenial to Wittgensteinian teleologists, 
it is absent from their writings. But this is unsurprising, since it is 
an objection Davidson raises against his own version of causalism. For 
Davidson, A’s reason for -ing is roughly speaking A’s mental 
state of believing that p will lead to q, in combination with her 
mental state of entertaining a “pro-attutide” or desiring that q 
(Glock 2013: 10). Accordingly, reasons are pro-attitudes and 
beliefs. These are states or dispositions, categorically distinct not 
just from actions (see sct. 10), but also from events. Only events, 
however, can be efficient causes. Therefore, the objection 
concludes, reasons cannot be efficient causes (contra causalism 
about reasons) and intentional explanations make no reference to 
causes (contra causalism about explanations). 
Davidson considers two responses. One is to regard reasons 
not as causes strictu sensu but as “causal conditions”. The other is to 
insist that the causes of actions consist in the “onslaught” of the 
primary reason, i.e. the coming into existence of the combination 
of belief and pro-attitude. These responses are obviously 
compatible. Yet even combined they will not reinstate Davidson’s 
official doctrine, enshrined in the standard story. After all, he 
propounds the slogan: reasons are causes (ARC 12, 4). But his 
responses only entitle him to the claim that reasons are causal 
conditions of action and that their onslaughts are the causes of 
action. 
Even this modified version of Davidson’s doctrine is 
subjectivist. Mental phenomena play a dual role: They both cause and 
rationalize the action. According to some recent commentators, 
however, Davidson’s position, rightly understood, actually 
converges on objectivism. The item that causes differs from the item 
that rationalizes. It is the occurrence of the attitude (“onslaught”), 
i.e. a mental event, which causes the action. The causal relation 
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holds between two occurrences, mental event and bodily 
movement. It is the content of the attitude which rationalizes the 
action. The relation of rationalization holds between the 
propositional content of the mental attitude and the description of 
the action (e.g. Keil 2012). 
All very well, since objectivism is not just closer to Wittgenstein 
than subjectivism, but also to the truth (Glock 2012), except that 
this modification of Davidson’s theory simply amounts to 
abandoning causalism about reasons. It concedes that reasons simply 
are neither mental causes – i.e. events of onslaughts – nor even mental 
causal conditions – i.e. states of believing and desiring brought about 
by these onslaughts.  
This concession has implications not just for Davidson’s 
relation to Wittgenstein, but also for his famous accusation that 
Quine’s theory of meaning is guilty of a “third dogma of 
empiricism”, the dualism of conceptual scheme and empirical 
content. According to Quine, the stimulus-meaning of simple 
sentences consists of the set of neural stimulations that would 
prompt assent to that sentence. Davidson complains that this 
account posits “epistemic intermediaries” to intervene between the 
world and our beliefs and utterances (1984: ch. 13; 2001: chs. 3, 
10). He accuses Quine of succumbing to the empiricist “myth of 
the given”, the idea that pre-conceptual sensory stimulations 
provide the foundations of knowledge and of meaning. 
Davidson denies that neural stimulations can play either the 
epistemic role of providing the evidence for our beliefs or the 
semantic role of determining the meaning of our sentences. Neural 
firings feature in the causal chain between objects and events on 
the one hand, beliefs and assent on the other. But to think of them 
as evidence is to confuse the causes of our beliefs with the 
“reasons” or “justification” on which they rest. Neural events 
cannot stand in relations of either logical or probabilistic support 
(2001: 141-4; 2004: 69-70).  
Prima facie, this line of criticism is compatible with Davidson’s 
thesis that reasons are causes. The latter only implies that all 
reasons are causes, not that all causes are reasons, thereby allowing 
that neural stimulations can be causes without being reasons. 
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However, Davidson’s central tenet is that events can be described 
in different idioms. He also insists that logical relations are de dicto, 
i.e. due to the way we describe things, whereas causal relations hold 
between events no matter how described. Therefore Davidson 
must allow that there are descriptions of neural events under which 
they stand in logical or probabilistic relations to beliefs. The retinal 
stimulation that causes me to see a sign-post ahead marks the 
onslaught of my belief that there is a sign-post ahead, yet it also 
stands in a logical relation to that belief. An obvious remedy is to 
distinguish between the neural cause of my believing and the 
reason, which is neither the mental state of believing nor its neural 
cause, but rather what is believed – an objective state of affairs, 
namely that there is a sign-post ahead. This remedy is suggested not 
merely by the interpretation just mentioned, but also by some of 
Davidson’s own remarks (e.g. 1980: xi). However, it implies that 
there is a difference between the item that causes the believing – 
the neural event – and the item that justifies it – its content. 
Assuming a strict identity of reasons and causes, Davidson is at 
best entitled to insist against Quine on a distinction between causal 
explanation and epistemic justification, as when he writes “a causal 
explanation of a belief does not show how or why the belief is 
justified”. He is not entitled to invoke an ontological distinction, e.g. 
when he inveighs against “transmuting a cause into a reason” or 
writes “even if our reasons for our beliefs are always other beliefs, 
the causes sometimes lie elsewhere” (2001: 143, 169). 
15. Causalism about Explanation and Davidson’s 
Challenge 
What is left of the Davidsonian position as it features in the 
standard story is causalism about intentional explanations. The 
reasons for which an agent acts are facts, as she sees them. But the 
explanation of her actions refer to her coming to believe these facts 
or presumed facts. 
As regards the tenability of causalism about explanation, the 
seminal contribution of ARC is a challenge to teleologists, namely 
to explain the difference between a reason A had for -ing and the 
reason for which A actually -ed. It is the challenge to explain the 
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“mysterious” special connection between the reason and the action 
without invoking the notion of a cause (1980: 11). In my view one 
can distinguish three responses to this challenge. 
 Third Generation Causalism: shoring up the causalist picture, 
notably through modifying (widening) the notion of causation.  
 Patternalism: what distinguishes the reason from a reason is the 
role that the reason (propositional content) plays and has played 
in the agent’s mental and public biography – whether it fits into 
the pattern of her thoughts, utterances, and deeds. 
 Deliberationism: what distinguishes a reason from the reason is 
that only the reason weighed in A’s deliberations, either ante or 
post factum. 
Patternalism and, to a lesser extent deliberationism, are inspired by 
Wittgenstein. Are any of these responses capable of meeting 
Davidson’s challenge, either singly or in combination? That 
question must be left for another occasion.12 
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